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Abstract
This work characterizes an important aspect of the political culture of the 
Chilean radical right in the 20th century: its use of history as a political tool and the 
introduction of political themes into the presentation of historical subjects or events. 
The main example is the reliance on the work of Diego Portales and his foundational 
role in the formation of the Chilean state and its institutions. The analysis describes 
the development of a Chilean radical right which ideologically relies on the work of 
serious historians but also “uses” history for contemporary political purposes. The 
1 This article has been developed from a research that began years ago and was presented in 
University of Vienna at a seminar of the Department of Latin American Studies, in January 2009 and 
in LASA-Chicago 2013.
2  (mario.sznajder@mail.huji.ac.il). Recent publications: Barahona de Brito, A., M. Sznajder, “The 
Politics of the Past: The Southern Cone and Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective” in Southern 
European Society and Politics 15 (3) 2010, published also in A. Costa Pinto and L. Morlino (Eds.) Dealing 
with the Legacy of Authoritarianism (London and New York: Routledge, 2011). Also as “A politica do 
pasado: America Latina e Europa do Sul” in A. Costa Pinto (ed.) A Sombra das Ditaduras (Lisboa: ICS, 
2013) pp. (in Portuguese). Also in A. Costa Pinto, F. C. Palomares Martinho (eds.) O pasado que nao 
passao. A sombra das ditaduras na Europa do Sul e na America Latina (Rio de Janeiro: Civilizaçao 
Brasileira, 2013); M. Sznajder, “Israele e la Primavera araba,” Il Mulino 4, 2011, also published as, M. 
Sznajder, “Israel y la Primavera Árabe,” in Manuel Férez, Elisenda Balleste (Eds.); Medio Oriente y Norte 
de África. ¿Reforma, Revolución o Continuidad? (México: Senado de la República, 2011); L. Roniger, M. 
Sznajder, “Human rights and human rights violation in the Southern Cone,” in Thomas Cushman (Ed.) 
Handbook of Human Rights (London and New York: Routledge, 2012); M. Sznajder, L. Roniger, C. A. 
Forment (eds.) Shifting Frontiers of Citizenship: The Latin American Experience (Leiden, Boston, MA: 
Brill, 2013); M. Sznajder (ed.) “Israel 2013” en Araucaria 30 (15), segundo semestre 2013; M. Sznajder, 
L. Roniger, The politics of exile in Latin America (New York, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009) and its Spanish translation, La política del destierro y el exilio en América Latina (México: Fondo 
de Cultura Económica, 2013).
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period analyzed is the 20th century in which Chile alternated between democracy 
and authoritarian dictatorships which were in a certain way influenced also by the 
radical right.
Key-words: Radical right, Conservative right, History, Politics, 
Corporativism, Subsidiarity, Chile 
Resumen
Este trabajo caracteriza un aspecto importante de la cultura política de la 
extrema derecha chilena en el siglo XX: su uso de la historia como instrumento 
político y la introducción de asuntos políticos contemporáneos en su presentación 
de sujetos o eventos históricos. El ejemplo principal de ese aspecto es el apoyo de 
la extrema derecha en el trabajo de Diego Portales y su papel fundacional en la 
formación del estado chileno y sus instituciones. El análisis describe el desarrollo 
de la extrema derecha chilena que se apoya, en sus análisis, en el trabajo de serios 
historiadores pero “usa” la historia para propósitos políticos contemporáneos. 
El período analizado es el siglo XX en el que Chile alternó entre democracia y 
dictaduras autoritarias que fueron, en cierta medida, influenciadas por la extrema 
derecha.
Palabras-clave: Extrema Derecha, Derecha Conservadora, Historia, 
Política, Corporativismo, Subsidiariedad, Chile.
Introduction
One of the most used –and abused– forms of acquisition of political 
legitimacy involves mixing political and historical arguments, rewriting 
–or rather re-interpreting– past history according to contemporary political 
circumstances and needs, as well as using historical examples –real or mythical, 
contextualized or taken out of context– in order to claim legitimacy and right – 
in both senses. Being right, historically, and therefore, having the right to rule, 
or at least the right to impose their ideological position.
The concept of the right is, in politics, an elusive one, since it includes anti-
reform and anti-revolutionary movements generally defined as conservative 
and also radical right groups generally associated with xenophobic and 
sometimes racist attitudes but committed to radical change3. In general, the 
political radical right tends to reject rationalism and reason as bases for political 
action, denying the possible utility of political constructivism. Instead, the most 
3  Desmond King, ‘Right,’ in Joel Krieger (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World 
(New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 790-791.
179Politics in History: The Chilean radical right in the 20th century
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades, año 17, nº 34. Segundo semestre de 2015. 
Pp. 177-201.   ISSN 1575-6823   e-ISSN 2340-2199   doi: 10.12795/araucaria.2015.i34.09
conservative right believes tradition and custom to be a much sounder basis 
foundation for politics. The radical right and its extreme version, fascism, tends 
to adopt versions of political constructivism based on the non-rational parts of 
the human nature and especially the irrational behaviour of whom they see as 
the main modern political actor, that is, the crowd or mass4. Therefore, this kind 
of politicians abandon rational, consensual decision making and government 
through representation based on universal criteria of citizenship—criteria that 
serve as basis for modern democracy—in favour of various forms of qualified 
representation and authoritarianism. 
Political nationalism is one of the main features of an era in which polities 
are organized as nation-states. Whether we adopt Gellner’s functionalist 
approach that attributes nationalism to the dislocations caused by modernity and 
industrialization as well as by the development of the institutions of the modern 
state; or Anthony Smith’s views, turning to primordial identities elaborated 
through culture and politics; or Benedict O. Anderson’s use of literacy and 
the construction of imagined communities, it is difficult to avoid seeing the 
centrality of the concept nation, and its corollary, political nationalism, as a 
main component of the Latin American right5.
In this work, we will try to analyse the relationship between contemporary 
politics and history through the lenses of nationalism, as an active and central 
part of the right in Chile and other Latin American countries.6 The claim of this 
work is that the use – and abuse- of history through the creation of myths and 
partial, biased and out of context readings of the past has played a central role 
in the evolution of the right in Latin America and particularly in Chile. 
Chile’s Parliamentarian Republic (1891-1925) was characterized by 
political patronage system and electoral corruption. The generalized feeling 
of moral decadence and crisis found important Chilean intellectual figures not 
only longing for the lost Portales order but harshly criticising— in nationalist 
terms—Chile’s realities after a century of independence. Alberto Edwards, 
Francisco Encina, Tancredo Pinochet and Guillermo Subercaseaux expressed 
their criticism in different ways and there was an attempt to articulate a 
Nationalist Union –Unión Nacionalista– without much success. Griffin, dealing 
with Francisco Encina’s historical revisionism writes:
It outrages scholars because of the cavalier way in which it disregards all 
the rules of the professional historian’s craft; it outrages present day-liberals 
4  The first theoretical background in this direction can be found in Gustave Le Bon, The crowd: a 
study of the popular mind (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1908). 
5  See, Ernst Gellner, Nations and nationalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983); Anthony Smith, 
The ethnic origins of nations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987); Benedict O. Anderson, Imagined 
communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (London: Verso, 1987).
6  Ana Maria Alonso, ‘The Effects of Truth: Re-Presentations of the Past and the Imagining of 
Community,’ Journal of Historical Sociology, 1 (1) 1988, 33-57. This article provides a sound 
theoretical ground to the claims made in this work.
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because its attacks on Barros Arana and the whole liberal tradition in Chilean 
historiography; it shocks the filio-pietist sentiments of many by ruthlessly 
cutting down to size figures in a whole gallery of patri patriae and magnifying 
the historical role of other heroes; it titillates the Hispanist sentiment of one 
sector of the Chilean intellectual way while it infuriates the indigenistas and 
Americanists7.
Encina’s nationalist political interpretations of Chilean realities, well 
presented in one of his most famous works: Nuestra inferioridad económica: 
sus causas, sus consecuencias published in 1911 before the foundation of the 
Nationalist Party in Chile in 1915, serve as an example of a trend that will 
grow, both in Chile and the rest of Latin America, along the 20th century and 
the political crises involving nationalist groups8. Alberto Edwards Vives, a 
co-founder, with Encina, Subercaseaux, Galdames and Pinochet, of Chilean 
modern nationalism, inspired by Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West, 
wrote many essays, articles and his main work, La fronda aristocrática en Chile 
in which a claim for modern nationalist authoritarianism is called to replace the 
egoistic and decadent rule of Chile’s parliamentarian oligarchy9.
A precedent to this brand of nationalist historical revisionism can be found 
in the work of Nicolás Palacios, who tried to explain Chile’s military superiority 
over its neighbours during the 19th century as a result of the miscegenation 
between two warrior races: the Germanic Goths (Godos) from Northern Spain, 
settling in Chile on behalf of the Spanish Crown, and the Araucanian (Mapuche) 
Indians, defending their soil10.
Latin American radical right
In Argentina, the historian Ricardo Rojas used similar arguments to 
those employed by Encina, but in a different context. Being Argentina at the 
beginning of the 20th century a land of immigration, Rojas was preoccupied 
with the impact of this phenomenon in his own nation. Rojas wrote against 
the British imperialism as we all as against the uncontrolled Italian and Jewish 
7  Charles C. Griffin, ‘Francisco Encina and Revisionism in Chilean History,’ Hispanic American 
Historical Review, 37 (1) 1957, 2
8  Francisco A. Encina, Nuestra inferioridad económica: sus causas, sus consecuencias (Santiago: 
Imprenta Universitaria, 1911). A serious personal and intellectual attack on Encina and his historical 
work is waged in Ricardo Donoso, Francisco A. Encina: Simulador (Santiago: Editorial Ricardo 
Neupert, 1969) 2 vols. See also, Guillermo Subercaseaux, Los ideales nacionalistas frente al 
doctrinarismo de nuestros partidos políticos históricos (Santiago: Imprenta Universitaria, 1918).
9  Alberto Edwards Vives, La fronda aristocrática en Chile (Santiago: Imprenta Nacional, 1928). 
Tancredo Pinochet, novelist, journalist and essay’s writer was seen also as one of the main intellectual 
figures of Chilean nationalism in the first half of the 20th century.
10  Nicolás Palacios, La raza chilena: su nacimiento, nobleza de sus orígenes (Valparaíso: Imprenta 
y Litografía Alemana, 1904)
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immigration as dangers that, if combined with destructive individualism, 
liberalism’s centrifugal tendencies and cosmopolitanism, could seriously 
damage the future of the Argentinean nation11.
The ideas circulated among nationalist intellectuals, willing readers and 
listeners who found political echo in the armed forces groups and especially 
in one of their main leaders in Chile, Colonel Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, who 
played a central role in the events of 1924-1925 which led to the enactment of 
a new constitution and the establishment of his own military rule between 1927 
and 193112.
Although every nationalism stressed local particularities, common 
features are present in all of them. In general, these interpretations are 
strongly anti-liberal and they do not lack a popular undertone, although this 
is tainted by anti-Marxism and an aversion to the idea of interclass war. The 
underpinnings of this kind of reading of past history are in the acceptance of 
the principle of private property and market economy, but strongly organized 
under the aegis of the state and in a productionist and authoritarian economic-
political model. These ideas were linked to the origins of European fascism, 
but in their historical reading, were presented both as a reaction against what 
in the 20th century terms could be classified as a moderate right, in its liberal 
or conservative forms. The use of historical myths, less of Golden Ages that 
were difficult to find in the convulsions of post-independence and nation-state 
building periods, and more of national heroes ‘founding’ the new nation, were 
a common feature of the countries in Latin America. San Martin and Rosas 
played that role in Argentina, Artigas, and Lavalleja in Uruguay, Rodríguez de 
Francia and the López (father and son) in Paraguay, O’Higgins and Portales 
in Chile, Bolivar in Venezuela and Colombia and also Santander in the later, 
and the emperors in Brazil, to mention just a few. David Brading considered 
all these figures were depicted by nationalist revisionist intellectuals more in 
terms of nationalism –founding fathers of the “nation”– than in terms of local 
patriotism13. In general, an attack against the liberal oligarchic groups that were 
associated with stabilization and economic expansion was essential. Such were 
the cases against Argentina’s liberals that defeated Juan Manuel de Rosas - 
seen by Argentina historical revisionists as a founding figure of the country 
after San Martín. In Chile, Portales and Balmaceda were counterpoised to the 
11  For an excellent analysis of this point see David Rock, Authoritarian Argentina. The Nationalist 
Movement. Its History and its Impact (Berkeley, CA: California University Press, 1993) 44-45. 
See also, Ricardo Rojas, La restauración nacionalista, informe sobre la educación (Buenos Aires: 
Ministerio de Justicia e Instrucción Pu ́blica, 1909).
12  Jaime Etchepare J., Víctor García U., Mario Valdés U., ‘La ideología nacionalista y su proyección 
partidista en Chile 1925-1973,’ Política y Geoestrategia 44 (1987) 20-21.
13  See, David Brading, ‘Patriotism and the Nation in Colonial Spanish America,’ in Luis Roniger, 
Mario Sznajder (eds.) Constructing Collective identities and Shaping Public Spheres. Latin American 
Paths (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1998) 29-30.
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oligarchic parliamentarian republic. In Brazil, to a lesser extent, nationalists 
and the Açao Integralista Brasileira (Brazilian Integralist Action) saw in 
colonial times, in which Portuguese control and influence were feeble, the 
basis of the development of a Brazilian nation that crystallized politically in the 
imperial period and severely decayed during the Oligarchic Republic finally 
destroyed by the 1930 revolution. The Açao Integralista Brasilera stressed also 
another historical myth, in the Sorelian sense of the concept, built around the 
glorification of the Indians who inhabited the land of Brazil before the arrival 
of the Portuguese14. This came as a reaction against the Brazilian nationalist 
theories about ‘whitening through immigration’ which floated at the beginning 
of the 20th century15.
It is true that nationalism in Argentina used the combination of the image of 
Rosas and anti-imperialism - especially against British imperialism, to generate 
mass appeal, while Chilean nationalism was of a more elitist character and 
Brazilian Integralist Action, although widely mobilizing, lasted for a relatively 
short period in the 1930’s and was dissolved and persecuted by Vargas.16 
Brazilian intellectuals as Oliveira Vianna and Torres influenced Integralism in 
their country. Oliveira Vianna expressed his ideas about the whitening of Brazil 
–embranquecimento– through declining fertility of the Afro-Brazilians and 
increasing European immigration17. Alberto Torres was even more influential, 
especially in the leader of Integralist Action, Plinio Salgado, through the 
theories of positive racial miscegenation18. While Gustavo Barroso, other 
main leader of Brazilian Integralism, preconized openly anti-Semitism, Plinio 
Salgado, the main leader, adopted a softer attitude in this area, nuanced by 
the above contradictions and paradoxes related to the national ‘viability’ of 
a society and a country in which ethnic miscegenation and even religious 
syncretism were a central part of life19. All this could be seen in a historical 
conception of the foundational myth of Brazil presented by Plinio Salgado, 
the main leader of the AIB. The historical myth was built around the Paulista 
expeditions, or Bandeiras, who characterized colonial Brazil. Salgado, who 
14  Helgio Trindade, ‘Fascism and Authoritarianism in Brazil under Vargas (1930-1945)1,’ in 
Stein Ugelvik Larsen (ed.) Fascism Outside Europe (Boulder, CO: and New York: Social Science 
Monographs and Columbia University Press, 2001) 514.
15  Thomas E. Skidmore, Black into White. Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1993) 65-69.
16  On a comparison between historical revisionism in the nationalist Right of Argentina, Brazil 
and Chile and the Radical Right in the three countries see, Sandra McGee Deutsch, Las derechas. The 
Extreme Right in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, 1890-1939 Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1999) 327-328 et al.
17  Francisco José de Oliveira Vianna, As Populaçoes Meridionais do Brasil; historia, organização, 
psycologia (Sao Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1933) 3rd Edition.
18  See Alberto Torres, O problema nacional brasileiro; introducção a um programma de 
organização nacional (Sao Paulo: Companhia editora nacional, 1933)
19  For a more detailed analysis of the racial issue in Brazil see David Cleary, ‘Race, nationalism and 
social theory in Brazil: rethinking Gilberto Freyre,’ WPTC -99-09. 
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in spite of European fascist influences, placed Catholic idealism in the centre 
of his views, saw in Brazilian colonial history a continuous tension between 
spiritual and material factors, coming together in his Integralist ideology20.
Intellectual nationalism has one of its most important examples in 
Argentinean nationalism until the assumption of power by Peron. The figure of 
Leopoldo Lugones, one of the most famous writers in the country and groups 
of less notorious intellectual figures and publicists such as Manuel Gálvez, the 
brothers Rodolfo and Julio Irazusta, and Arturo Jauretche, to mention just the 
most prominent examples, constitute various groups of the Argentinean radical 
right21. Here again, historians such as Rojas and Gálvez promote the importance 
of the Hispanic legacy and the anti-liberal ethos, as basis for Argentine’s 
modern nationalism.
Chile’s rights
Chile’s reality suffers and reflects, to a great extent, developments abroad. 
Thus, ideas and political programs circulated and put into practice in Spain 
under the dictatorship of General Miguel Primo de Rivera –who found partial 
inspiration in Mussolini’s fascism– were extrapolated and adapted into the 
Chilean reality. 
The world economic crisis and its impact on Chile provided further 
arguments to extreme nationalists that appeared in the political scenario in 
1932 under the banners of the Movimiento Nacional Socialista de Chile - 
MNS. Historically, the intellectual leaders of the MNS relied on Palacios, 
Edwards, and Encina, but they also wrote pamphlets and books in which 
historical myths, such as the enhancing of Portales, played a central role in 
the construction of their nationalism22. Moreover, the transformation and 
adaptation of European fascist ideology to local needs produced an electoral 
party represented in Parliament that at the same time sent its militiamen to 
confront the left in the streets and publicly attacked liberal democracy in 
its publications and speeches. The double soul of Chile’s Nacismo –Creole 
Nazism, written in Spanish with a c, playing parliamentary politics and 
20  Plinio Salgado, O que é o integralismo (Rio de Janeiro: Schmidt, 1935) 3. ed. 
21  See Alberto Spektorowski, The Origins of Argentina’s Revolution of the Right (Notre Dame, 
IND: Notre Dame University Press, 2003). Spektorowski attacks the thesis held by authors such as 
Buchrucker, Hernández Arregui and Ramos claiming that Argentina’s nationalism was nostalgic and 
anti-modernist. Spektorowski stresses the fascist influences – including the use of mobilizing myths 
and the interplay between history and politics – on Argentina’s Radical Right.
22  See, Jorge González von Marees, El problema del hambre. Su causas y solución (Santiago: 
Ercilla, 1937) and Idem, El mal de Chile. Sus causas y remedios (Santiago: Talleres Gráficos Portales, 
1940) and Carlos Keller, Un país al garete. Contribución a la seismología social de Chile (Santiago: 
Nascimento, 1932).
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even supporting the presidential candidacy of Carlos Ibáñez but at the same 
time engaged in repeated episodes of political violence– brought about the 
attempt to trigger a military coup against the civilian government through 
armed action on September 5, 1938, shortly before the national elections23. 
The results were catastrophic for the MNS. The army did not rebel, many of 
the naci activists that participated in the armed uprising were concentrated in 
the Social Security Building (Caja del Seguro Obrero), from which they had 
fired on the presidential palace of La Moneda, and summarily executed by the 
police. The MNS leader, Jorge González von Marees, went underground and 
instructed his followers to vote for the candidate of the anti-fascist Popular 
Front, a turn of events which probably brought to power the Radical Party 
candidate, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, leader of the anti-fascist Frente popular, who 
had opposed both the nationalist Ibáñez and the liberal Gustavo Ross Santa 
María.24 Although the MNS was strongly nationalist, anti-Marxist as well as 
anti-liberal, and referred to itself (in the classic way that European fascism 
did) as a ”third way” between Capitalism and Communism; after the failure 
of the attempt to overthrow President Arturo Alessandri Palma, González 
von Marées, shocked by the massacre of his followers at the hands of the 
forces of Chile’s liberal democracy and relying on the social side of Chile’s 
Nacismo, nearer to Aguirre Cerda’s leftist program than to the liberal ideology 
of Ross Santa María, decided to call his followers to support the former. 
Since previous elections had shown that the MNS commanded between 3% 
(parliamentarian elections of 1937) and 4.5% (municipal elections of 1938) 
of the vote and Aguirre Cerda won with a difference of less than 1% of the 
vote, it is possible to assume that the naci vote was decisive for the accession 
to power of the candidate of the Popular front25. 
Political nationalism in Chile was weakened by the events of September-
October 1938. The failure of the MNS brought part of its leaders to create a new 
party of more leftist leaning: the Vanguardia Popular Socialista that functioned 
for about three years. During the war years, a Nationalist Movement was active 
in Chile, replicating the political style and the central ideological points of the 
MNS. In 1945, the Partido Agrario Laborista –PAL– became a meeting point 
for all the former nationalist and republican groups. This party, led by Jaime 
Larraín García, became one of the strongest political forces in Chile at the 
beginning of the 1950s. The PAL presented the candidacy of Ibáñez for the 
presidential elections of 195226.
23  Mario Sznajder, ‘A case of Non-European Fascism: Chilean National Socialism in the 1930s,’ 
Journal of Contemporary History 28 (2) 1993, 269-296.
24  Ibid. 273-283.
25  See also, Jaime Antonio Etcheparre, Hamish I. Stewart, ‘Nazism in Chile: A Particular Type of 
Fascism in South America,’ Journal of Contemporary History 30 (4) 1995, 577-605.
26  Etchepare et al. ‘La ideología nacionalista...’ 23-25. 
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Meanwhile, inspired in the example of the Spanish Falange and the JONS 
and the lessons of the Civil War in that country, a group led by Ramón Callis, 
Delfín Alcalde, Daniel Frías, Gastón Acuña and father Osvaldo Lira, founded in 
1947 the MRNS –Movimiento Revolucionario Nacional Sindicalista (National 
Syndicalist Revolutionary Movement)– still active under the leadership 
of Misael Galleguillos. This political association adopted a strongly anti-
Marxist position all along its existence, struggled against Salvador Allende’s 
government and was coopted by the military government of Chile since 1973.
At the end of 1946, a journalist and ex-leader of the Conservative Party 
Youth, Jorge Prat Echaurren, founded the bi-weekly –later weekly publication– 
Estanquero, which ran until mid-1954. Estanqueros was the denomination of 
the followers of Diego Portales. Prat’s kind of nationalism was characterized 
by strong anti-communism, patriotism, an anti-politicians vision, criticisms to 
liberal democracy, a stress on the special value of the Spanish tradition and its 
Chilean Republican and dynamic offshoot, an organic view of society, an anti-
materialist approach, and the need of a strong and inspired leader - Prat would 
support Ibáñez in his successful quest for the presidency in 1952 - and stress the 
special role of the armed forces in national life27.
After the failures of the Ibáñez presidency –1952-1958– and the perception of 
a rising Marxist menace, Chilean Nationalism entered again the electoral political 
arena at the end of 1963 when Sergio Onofre Jarpa –an ex-PAL leader– established 
a new political party, Acción Nacional, that presented Jorge Prat as presidential 
candidate for the 1964 elections, supported also by the MRNS. Although finally 
Prat’s candidacy was withdrawn, the relative growth of the number of supporters of 
the Marxist left, combined with what was perceived as a leftist ideological tilt of the 
victorious Christians Democrats led by Frei –president of Chile 1964-1970– and 
the electoral decline of the traditional right wing parties, were behind the formation 
of a new coalition that would become the Partido Nacional. This novel political 
party was established in June 1966 as a result of the union of the Conservative 
Party, the Liberal Party and Acción Nacional.
Some of the demands of the nationalists’ followers of Prat in the new 
party were problematic for the other supporters. The nationalization of mining 
resources; a strong foreign affairs policy oriented towards the Pacific basin; 
the demands to reform the political system favouring a stronger executive and 
a ‘depuration` of all democratic institutions and a ‘productionist’ version of 
Agrarian Reform were difficult issues for the ex-Liberals and ex-Conservatives 
to accept. Internal frictions brought about the resignation of Jorge Prat in 1967.
In 1969, Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez –ex-president of Chile 1958-1964– 
became the presidential candidate of the Partido Nacional and of the Chilean 
right. Various nationalist groups and individuals supported his candidature. 
27  Sergio Miranda C., ‘Jorge Prat: Personalidad y Obra,’ Portada 36 (1973) 9-11.
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The attempt to present an independent nationalist candidate –General (ret.) 
Roberto Viaux Marambio–, who had led the October 1969 uprising of the 
Tacna regiment, failed28.
Political Crisis and Nationalism
After the election of Salvador Allende, leading a coalition of parties headed 
by Marxist socialists and communists (Unidad Popular - Popular Unity), as 
president of Chile –4 September 1970– one of the nationalist supporters of 
Alessandri, Pablo Rodríguez Grez, founded the Movimiento Cívico Patria y 
Libertad (Civic Movement Fatherland and Freedom) whose main goal was to 
prevent Allende from becoming president of the country29. The failure of the 
attempted abduction of General René Schneider, the commander in chief of the 
army, in October 1970, by a commando of civilian nationalists, and their later 
assassination of the general, did not trigger the military forces’ coup30.
In spite of the political agreement between the Christian Democrats and 
Allende’s supporting coalition that made possible Allende’s accession to the 
presidency after Congressional approval, Chile’s politics turned more violent 
and polarized than in the preceding four decades. 
In March 1971, the Frente Nacionalista Patria y Libertad (Nationalist 
Front Fatherland and Freedom - FNPL) replaced its civic predecessor. After 
losing the political battle to preclude Congress from confirming Allende’s 
election to the presidency, its leaders decided to take the path of direct and 
extra-parliamentary action against the leftist constitutional government of 
Chile. Many of its members were trained as part of a para-military organization. 
28  The details of the Tacnazo, 21 October 1969 are in Florencia Varas, Conversaciones con Viaux 
(Valparaiso: Nueva Era, 1974) 88-113. Viaux was also involved in the plot to kidnap General René 
Schneider, in October 1970.
29  The idea behind the foundation of the Movimiento Cívico Patria y Libertad took shape 
after Allende won the 4 September 1970 election with a small difference of nearly 40.000 votes, 
something which left him without an absolute majority and in need of Congressional approval –on 24 
October 1970– to become president. Allende could have been blocked by the right together with the 
Christian Democrats—since they together had a clear parliamentarian majority. Then Congress could 
constitutionally elect President Jorge Alessandri who had obtained the second majority of votes. After 
his nomination, Alessandri would have resigned and the Senate President would have become Interim 
President, calling for a new election. To this election, Eduardo Frei, the outgoing president, could 
have postulated as a candidate, and probably won, having resolved the problem of the prohibition of 
consecutive presidential re-election. Many of the supporters of Alessandri favored this solution and 
adhered to Pablo Rodríguez initiative. Among them we could find a large group of gremialistas, led 
by Jaime Guzmán Errázuriz. However, their plans were thwarted by Alessandri himself who, on 19 
October 1970 called the members of Congress to vote for Allende, in order to confirm the results of 
the popular vote. The failure of the political alternative is one of the explanations of the kidnapping 
and assassination of General Schneider. 
30  Varas, Conversaciones con Viaux, 126-139. Patria y Libertad was unrelated to the abduction and 
assassination of General René Schneider.
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Retired armed forces personnel joined the FNPL and many active officers were 
secretly linked to it. The leaders of this movement claimed that the CIA did not 
financially support them as it did regarding other groups opposed to Allende’s 
rule. This, according to Pablo Rodríguez, was due to the fact that the FNPL was 
a movement linked to a ‘nationalist left’ and therefore anti-imperialist and anti-
American.31 In spite of this fact, supporters of Allende’s government perceived 
Patria y Libertad as the incarnation of the fascist right. 
Increasing polarization brought forth what Pablo Rodríguez called 
‘hysterically anti-Marxist’ elements which joined Patria y Libertad. Powerful 
business leaders and many right wingers were also in touch with the FNPL, 
seeing in it a vehicle to overthrow Allende. Rodríguez claimed that during 
Allende’s period, he met with important Chilean entrepreneurs such as Manuel 
Cruzat, Javier Vial, Jorge Yarur, and others, to whom he presented nationalist 
ideas of ‘integrated enterprises’ and capital transfer to the workers. He recalls 
that none of them objected this scheme, as long as Allende was thrown out of 
power. Facing the dilemma between ideological ‘purity’ - meaning limiting 
Patria y Libertad only to ideologically convinced nationalists - and political 
‘practicality’, Rodríguez preferred the second option, accepting non-ideological 
elements as well as large capitals support in order to be able to do the dirty 
work of destabilising the Popular Unity government and triggering military 
intervention. Rodríguez himself set aims to be achieved in two stages, the first 
of which culminated on 11 September 1973, when the armed forces deposed 
Allende, but, at the same time, liquidated Patria y Libertad as a political 
movement. The second aim, the installation of a nationalist state, was to be 
carried out by the military with the support and ideological guidance of Chilean 
modern nationalism –and its anti-political party’s attitude– that envisioned 
wide popular mobilisation and a direct relationship between the authoritarian 
leadership and the masses32.
Polarisation affected other sectors of the Chilean right and especially the 
National Party encompassing most of the non-fascist and traditional right who 
opposed Allende. They were led by people formed in the ranks of Chilean 
nationalism as Sergio Onofre Jarpa –later Pinochet’s ambassador to Buenos 
Aires, Minister of Interior Affairs in the early 1980s and leader of Renovación 
Nacional, the main post-Pinochet right wing party– and Mario Arnello Romo, 
one of the founders of the National Party and professionally an expert on 
National Syndicalism – the subject of his doctoral thesis at the University of 
Madrid in 1953. 
31  ‘Pablo Rodríguez, ‘el jefe’,’ Hoy, 4 April 1979, 22. His version is supported by the declassified 
CIA’s documents that deal with Allende’s accession to power.
32  Ibid. 21-22.
188 Mario Sznajder
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades, año 17, nº 34. Segundo semestre de 2015. 
Pp. 177-201.   ISSN 1575-6823   e-ISSN 2340-2199   doi: 10.12795/araucaria.2015.i34.09
On 29 June 1973, an attempt of military putsch was carried out by an 
armoured regiment in Santiago and members of the FNPL. After some 
skirmishes in the centre of Santiago the rebellion was suppressed by the chief 
of staff, General Carlos Prats and the high command of the armed forces 
remaining loyal to the constitutional government. This failure brought about 
the flight into exile in Ecuador of Pablo Rodríguez and the most prominent 
leaders of the FNPL, being momentarily replaced as main leader by Sergio 
Miranda Carrington of the Tacna group. 
Meanwhile, other nationalist groups organized in para-military structures 
and opposed Allende’s government, some of them, especially the Comando 
Rolando Matus, had carried out destabilizing terrorist activities that created 
further polarization and produced a highly climate of insecurity33.
The incorporation of the nationalists to the military government was done 
on an individual basis and not necessarily according to their political importance, 
but to their personal skills. Pablo Rodríguez, the ideologist of Patria y Libertad 
was mentioned as a possible minister of justice but never called to fulfil this 
role or any other. Still, Rodríguez became close to colonel Manuel Contreras 
–commander of the DINA– and also Pinochet’s daughter, Lucía Pinochet 
Hiriart34. Federico Willoughby –an ex-conservative and supporter of Jorge 
Alessandri in 1970– was part of Pinochet’s staff in the area of communications. 
Other nationalists became part of the general’s Political Committee: Gisela 
Silva was in charge of Civil Organizations; Enrique Campos Menéndez –an ex 
liberal member of Congress– of Cultural Affairs; Gastón Acuña, was placed in 
charge of Information and Alvaro Puga –a leader of the FNPL so close to the 
military that he was the only civilian at the Ministry of Defence in the night 
between the 10 and 11 September 1973– of Public Affairs and a direct adviser 
to General Pinochet himself35.
The influence of the nationalists over military rule was not central but 
their anti-political vision was very well tuned for military hears. According 
to their ideological principles, the nationalists could live very well under the 
definition that Pinochet gave to military rule in Chile in the first months after the 
coup. They had three possible models: 1. a period of military transitional rule 
between two ‘political` governments; 2. a civic-military depuration movement 
33  See ‘Radiografía del delirio político. La ultraderecha,’ Punto Final (May 1991) 13.
34  Lucía Pinochet Hiriart, a kindergarten teacher and daughter of the General Pinochet, was 
chairperson of the Corporación de Estudios Nacionales – CEN (Corporation of National Studies) 
which published Pablo Rodríguez’ book, El mito de la democracia en Chile. 1833-1973 (Santiago: 
Eves, 1985). In this book, the leader of Patria y Libertad evokes the writings of the early 20th century 
nationalist historians and thinkers, such as Francisco Encina and Alberto Edwards, as guiding political 
lights. The CEN was one of the nationalist groups, although, its proximity to Pinochet made it less 
critical to government policies, even at times of crisis such as the 1982-3 recession, wave of protests 
and repression
35  It is interesting to note that Alvaro Puga was one of the leaders of Savador Allende’s political 
campaign to win the presidency of Chile in 1964. He had become an extreme nationalist by 1970.
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or; 3. the establishment of a permanent military regime, Pinochet declared that 
the military had adopted the second option. This created a situation in which 
the nationalists felt that their ideological influence could still bear institutional 
fruits in the future. Moreover, Pinochet’s rejection of proposals of rapid political 
normalization by party leaders indicated that already in the first semester of 
military rule, the idea of laying the foundations of a new kind of regime was 
becoming a reality36.
The leadership of Patria y Libertad, aware of the recruiting potential 
imbued in their strong anti-leftist stand, went one step forward by elaborating 
and publishing their nationalist ideological principles, as a political program 
closely related to contemporary events and containing what they perceived as 
solutions to Chile’s historical plights. The first Manifiesto Nacionalista was 
published in November 1971, and until June 1973 six editions were updated 
and published. The opening statement described nationalism as the most serious 
barrier to communism in Chile, claiming that Allende’s period was not another 
historical stage but a definitive one in which polarization was total and no 
middle ranges of political indecision could exist. According to the manifesto, 
communist demagogy and propaganda advance towards their goal of destruction 
of the essential values of Western and Christian civilization, central to Chile’s 
ethos, undermining the social structures and thriving on exacerbation of hatred 
and suicidal confrontation37. Nationalist analysis did not blame only the left 
and direct supporters of the Popular Unity government for the antidemocratic 
trends that were about to take control and convert the country into a totalitarian 
Marxist state but had other explanations too. In a long and detailed analysis, 
Pablo Rodríguez explained the failure of the non-Marxists parties in stopping 
the progress made by the left, especially after the government of Carlos Ibáñez 
in the 1950. At the end of Ibáñez’ the ‘ley maldita’ - dammed law: Ley de 
Defensa Permanente de la Democracia (Permanent Defence of Democracy 
Law) enacted in 1948 during the administration of Gabriel González Videla 
that barred Communist participation in Chile’s political life and brought to the 
detention in concentration camps of a large number of Communist leaders and 
activists and to the exile of others, was derogated. This fact, for Rodríguez, 
added to the weakness, divisiveness and corruption of the non-Marxist 
political parties that allowed Salvador Allende at the head of the FRAP –Frente 
Revolucionario de Acción Popular (Revolutionary Front for Popular Action) 
– to obtain the second plurality, losing the presidential election in which Jorge 
36  For a discussion of this point and the chronological sequence of events see, Ascanio Cavallo, 
Manuel Salazar and Oscar Sepúlveda, La historia oculta del régimen militar (Santiago: Ediciones La 
Epoca, 1988) 20-21.
37  Pablo Rodríguez G., Manifiesto Nacionalista (Santiago: Frente Nacionalista Patria y Libertad, 
1973) 6th edition, 4-5.
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Alessandri was elected, in 1958, by thirty thousand votes38. The nationalist 
conclusion was that Chile suffered from an institutional vacuum both at the 
state organization level as well as at the level of political organizations.
The events after 4 September [1970] were a result of a long process in which 
the Political Parties were in crisis, since they were unable to prevent the acces-
sion to power of an antidemocratic, internationalist and minority movement, 
against the clamour (outcry) of the national majorities that did not accept being 
surrendered to the voracity of [M]arxism39.
This evolved in the 1980s, according to the needs posed by the 
‘foundational` drive of military rule to the idea that 
...in Chile there was never a democratic regime, according to the real meaning 
of the word40.
Still, Chile’s society possessed also very positive elements with which it 
could, according to the nationalists, fight and defeat communism. Patria y Libertad 
and its supporters were a manifestation of this kind. Another one, at the institutional 
level and far more powerful as well as not less compromised with the destiny of 
the country, were the armed forces. Historically, nationalist groups in Chile enjoyed 
good and close relations with the armed forces. According to their historical views, 
the armed forces were patriotic and nationalist by definition, regardless of their 
political character or programs of nationalism. The armed forces, in nationalist 
eyes, were the only safeguard left for Chile’s non-Marxist historical institutional 
arrangements. In 1973 –before the coup– the military were deeply worried due to 
three facts: 1. the Marxist orientation of the government, guided by the Communist 
Party; 2. the possible disappearance of the traditional armed institutions and their 
replacement by militias or popular armies, following the experience of countries 
controlled by international communism and; 3. the humiliations suffered by a 
General Viaux Marambio whose influence over young officers and the troops 
augmented significantly, when he was tried for political crimes41.
38 Idem, Entre la democracia y la tiranía (Santiago: s.n., 1972) 12. It is interesting to point out 
that the author mentions the fact that Jorge Alessandri won the 1958 election by a plurality of 30.000 
votes, a similar plurality with which Allende won the 1970 election from Alessandri. (p. 27). Another 
interesting detail brought up by Rodríguez is the fact that Antonio Zamorano Herrera - El Cura de 
Catapilco - obtained 40.000 votes that, if obtained by Allende, would have given him a clear majority 
10.000 votes (p. 12).
39  Ibid., 42.
40  Pablo Rodríguez G., ‘Prefacio’ El mito de la democracia en Chile (Santiago: Eves Ediciones, 
1985). In this book, Rodríguez sustains his hypothesis by profusely quoting 20th century Chilean 
historians, beginning with Alberto Edwards. See also, Arturo Fontaine Talavera review of Pablo 
Rodríguez book in Arturo Fontaine Talavera, Pablo Rodríguez Grez, ‘El mito de la democracia en 
Chile (1985)’, Revista Ciencia Política 7 (2) 1985, 221-223.
41  Idem, Manifiesto nacionalista, 6.
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Nationalism lacked a strong and cohesive political leadership, or a single 
decisive leader. Jorge Prat, the traditionally and widely accepted leader of 
nationalism had died in November 1971. His last interview to a nationalist 
publication, Tacna, in May, six months before his death, clearly stated his 
vision and verdict about the destiny of Chile under Allende’s rule:
 
...I am sure that the country, and specially the weak people, is entering a stage 
of suffering as never known before. The adopted economic measures; the enor-
mous responsibility placed on the shoulders of an unable and badly politically 
selected, the bureaucracy that has to manage the enterprises being placed under 
state control; the lack of security and mistrust which will prevent creative ac-
tion by the ablest of men; and above all, the sterile, negative and criminal divi-
siveness imbued in the class ridden propaganda that the country receives day 
by day; all this will bring unemployment, economic paralysis, lack of supplies, 
budgetary deficit and inflation. We will live in a period worse than the one fol-
lowing a lost war42.
The death of the leader was another factor leading to the enunciation of 
a clear political platform that would serve as a basis of action and criteria of 
direction, once the nationalists would achieve their immediate goal: victory 
over Marxism in Chile. 
Together with saving the country in this dangerous moment, we aspire to es-
tablish the first Chilean Nationalist State inspired in duty, discipline, and social 
justice. Worthless will be freedom from Marxist oppression if we have no other 
destiny than misery, inequality and continuous social strife43.
A political platform, as clear and attractive as it may be, could not, by itself, 
replace the lack of political leadership. Nationalists saw Chileans as people that 
loved freedom and democracy and are used to live under a state of law ‘...which 
excludes the arbitrariness and the absolutism of the tyrant, be it called dictator or the 
party’s central committee’44. Here, Chilean nationalism is pointing to three elements 
–democracy, libertarianism and a state of law– that, at least theoretically, could 
place their desired nationalist state within the realm of Western democracies. But 
when defining the place of nationalism in the popular right-left political continuum 
the nationalists will take the Third Way position, historically associated with the 
ideological origins of fascism. While on principle rejecting the vulgarity of terms 
as left and right to define their political position, they will claim: 
42  ‘Prat, Visionario,’ Tacna (3, Mayo 1971), quoted from Miranda, ‘Jorge Prat: Personalidad y 
Obra,’...8-9. Sergio Miranda Carrington, a nationalist lawyer and supporter of the idea of a indefinite 
term military government led the Grupo Tacna during Allende’s government and was linked to 
General Viaux Marambio.
43  Rodríguez, Manifiesto nacionalista, 7.
44  Ibid. 9.
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We are from the right, as we love [our] history and feel dignified by it.; we are 
of the left, as we identify with deprived and the exploited; we are of the right, 
as we aspire to restore order and the empire of law; we are of the left, as we 
aspire to give ourselves an advanced organization, able to conquer the future.45
Therefore, and in order to understand and conciliate apparent contradictions 
in the way Chilean nationalists presented their views in the 1970s and 1980s, 
the terms, democracy, libertarianism and state of law must be placed in the 
perspective and conceptual framework of this movement. The nationalist 
program of 1973 contains six points directly related to the above mentioned 
concepts. It claims that Chile’s nationalist doctrine can be synthetized into six 
fundamental points to be achieved in the political practice: 1. A Fundamentalist 
State; 2. an Authoritarian Government; 3. people possessing Collective 
Responsibility and Social Discipline; 4. a Youth program; 5. an Integrated 
Enterprise System and; 6. a Functional Democracy. In this case the above 
mentioned concepts of democracy, libertarianism and state of law are also 
closely related to what Chilean nationalists considered an atypical historical 
development, as compared with the Latin American framework, and the six 
resulting doctrinal programs from Chile’s different historical experience are 
unrelated, again according to the nationalist view, with the historic development 
of fascism and Nazism in Europe. The searching for local roots leads directly to 
the political work of Diego Portales, seen by many as the founder of Chile, as 
stable state through the enactment of the 1833 Constitution. Patria y Libertad’s 
leader, Pablo Rodríguez, quoted Portales in 1822, claiming that then, as now, 
his words resounded with a special clearness: 
The democracy so preconized by dreamers is absurd in countries as the [A]mer-
icans, full of vices and where citizens lack all virtue, as necessary to establish a 
real republic....The republic is the system to be adopted; but, do you know how 
do I understand it in these countries? A strong, centralized government whose 
men are a real model of virtue and patriotism, and in this way, straightening 
the citizens on the road of order and of virtues [is needed]. When they become 
moralized, let come a completely liberal government, free and full of ideals, 
where all citizens will take part. This is what I think and any man with an aver-
age judgement will think the same46.
Portales model of state was preconized by the nationalists and other groups 
of the Chilean right as the one that imbued the real civic virtues that transformed 
Chile in the 19th century in an island of stability in the midst of the anarchic 
45  Ibid., 8. On the subject of the Third Way and Fascism see Zeev Sternhell, Mario Sznajder, Maia 
Asheri, Naissance de l’ideologie fasciste (Paris: Fayard, 1989) 11-51.
46  From a letter sent by Diego Portales to José Manuel Cea on 10 February 1822 as quoted in 
Rodríguez, El mito de la democracia en Chile, 25.
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sea of Latin America, a serious contradiction appeared around the social and 
individual education to the qualities Portales himself considered necessary for 
the establishment of the real republic: order and virtues, or a high level of 
civil morality. If the argument was that Portales state was imbued with these 
qualities and was a progressive one, working towards the foundation of the ‘real 
republic’, then, even superficial historical analysis would clearly show that it 
had failed in its purpose. The liberal period that followed the three conservative 
decades, from 1830s to 1860s showed the existence of profound cleavages that 
rapidly surfaced. Moreover, the establishment of the Parliamentarian Republic, 
as the result of the civil war of 1891, brought the opposite of Portales ideals to 
power: corruption and fractional interests. Then, as the nationalists themselves 
claimed, Chile lived since 1925 under a mythical democracy degenerating into 
a “particracy” in which political sectors and group interest groups were always 
preferred to those of the nation. Pablo Rodríguez explains military intervention 
in 1973 as a result of the existence of a failed democracy: 
With the fall of Allende, people understood that it was not just another govern-
ment that fell. It was the political system which, undermined by demagogy, 
class hatred, terrorism, violence and politiquería [‘petty politics’, used in a 
contemptuous way], was ending. Marxism was not, between Chileans, a po-
litical coincidence nor a lucky achievement of political adventurers. It was the 
systematic taking advantage of the vacuum and weaknesses of a formal democ-
racy. The fractures of the system were many and through them, the vices that 
feed totalitarian communism could sneak in47.
This nationalist line of analysis could only mean not only that Portales 
ideals were not fulfilled because the model he proposed had changed, but also 
that the new form of authoritarianism, in historical terms, was a long range 
issue, since the civic virtues needed to transform the republic in ‘real political 
property of the citizens body’ could only be achieved over long historical periods 
of authoritarian rule in which it would mature. Therefore, the failure of the 
model itself was evident and antithetical to the nationalist dream of integration 
and unity, which they wanted to achieve under strong authoritarianism. The 
failure was in the lack of capacity to sustain itself in power until civic virtues 
become the norm for most of the citizenschip, or perhaps, its inherent elitist 
nature. It favoured clear conservative political conclusions.
Portales himself, more than ‘a man for all seasons’ working in the 
extraordinarily difficult conditions of the disintegration of the Spanish American 
Empire –in which the society and culture of Chile had developed and the flux 
of liberal democratic and republican ideas, in the name of which the separation 
47  Ibid., 156.
194 Mario Sznajder
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades, año 17, nº 34. Segundo semestre de 2015. 
Pp. 177-201.   ISSN 1575-6823   e-ISSN 2340-2199   doi: 10.12795/araucaria.2015.i34.09
from Spain had been fought– can only be seen as a sceptic48. Observation of 
political reality –war and chaos– brought about the adoption of the republican 
ideal of an impersonal, strong and executive state, but at the same time, not 
believing that the social bases for such a state –the needed virtues of citizenship 
and social organization– could exist, therefore, relying on authoritarianism, a 
concept not necessarily linked to what were claimed to be Portales ideals. On 
the contrary, Portales himself, doubtful about his own society’s republican and 
democratic capacities, admitted that the citizens’ virtues have to be inculcated, 
but he seemed to leave open the space for democratization for the time when 
they will be moralized.
Undoubtedly, certain readings of Portales role and deeds, mostly of mythical 
character and suffering from the kind of extrapolations and applications that do 
not serve neither serious historical nor political readings, could be very useful 
to the nationalists –and other groups which supported military intervention and 
rule in Chile– for the creation of a historical myth –or various versions of the 
same myths with different political nuances, leading to different contemporary 
political conclusions in order to serve as tools for obtaining legitimacy in 
the process of demise of Chilean democracy in favour of an authoritarian 
experiment. This legitimacy, translated popularly in terms such as Chilenidad, 
traditionalism, common values or even the basic foundations of the nation 
and the state, were presented with the mechanism that interrelated history and 
politics. In these processes, historical facts and interpretations - also at the level 
of historical myths - became an integral part of the contemporary political 
discourse, mainly, for legitimization purposes of actual policies or trends, in 
an attempt to demonstrate that similar attitudes produced good results in the 
past. In parallel, the contemporary political discourse becomes inundated with 
historical figures and examples, setting the past in terms of current politics49.
Chilean nationalism could not escape the explanatory dilemma about the 
main role of the state, and by defining it as an integrating state it was ascribing to 
it a role well above the simple functional political-administrative meaning of the 
word. Nationalism was fighting to create the kind of state –Estado Integrador– 
that would transcend social classes, ideologies, interests and become a factor of 
unification and national cohesion. In order to achieve this goal, institutions should 
favour solidarity and equality between Chileans; and help to harmonize interests 
placing those of the nation above private or sectorial divisions. In short, this kind 
of state should create ‘...a moral and economic community, strongly rooted in 
48  On Diego Portales and the historiographical discussion about the interpretation of his role and 
ideas see the brilliant conclusions of Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt Letelier, El peso de la noche. Nuestra frágil 
fortaleza histórica (Santiago: Planeta, 1998) 2nd edition, 119-143.
49  On this subject see Ana María Alonso, ‘Effects of Truth: Re-Presentations of the Past and the 
Imagining of Community.’
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national values, identified with the common interests of our people’50. Harmony 
and arbitration between different interests are key words of this model. The 
nation can exist and transcend only when economic harmony, social peace and 
public tranquillity are the norm, and it is the existence of these that strengthen the 
state also. In the Manifiesto nacionalista the relationship between nation and state 
is unclear. If the harmonizing and pacifying nationalist state is so sorely needed, 
as it was also needed in the past, the nation probably suffered from high levels of 
divisiveness between classes, groups, ideological tendencies and so forth. More 
than one tradition coexists with the others and there is no agreed interpretation 
of the common past either. Then, one of the main tasks of the integrating state is 
probably to create the nation itself, since it is difficult to see in a highly divided 
social body the unifying qualities a nation should theoretically possess. This is 
another factor why, in its search for legitimacy, the nationalist ‘golden age’ has to 
be found in the past and is located in Portales’s period, which could be otherwise 
interpreted not only as the period of nation building, but also as the period of state-
building in which, more than tradition and organic, unifying national factors, the 
basic institutions of statehood were firmly established in Chile. A new process 
of nationalist modernization would take care of this former developments that 
included liberal as well as socialist trends of institutionalization in the form of 
both defence of private property and entrepreneurship and, at the same time, an 
enlargement of the economic role of the state has to be regenerated into an unified 
philosophy of development that subordinates everything to one central criteria: 
the interests of the nation.
Their third way proposed a productionist and corporativist economic model 
closely related to the one developed by national revolutionary syndicalism and 
different variants of fascism in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. In its Chilean 
version it called for the transformation of the capitalist enterprise into an 
“empresa integrada de trabajadores” (integrated workers enterprise) in which 
all the productive factors: capital, labour and organization51 that would unite 
in order to enhance productivity and be rewarded ‘in an equitable way and 
according to its importance’ from the benefits of wealth creation. Enterprises 
would, in this model, be managed by representatives of all the productive sectors 
and the role of the state would be to regulate the functioning of these bodies 
and to become arbitrator in case of difficulties arising from ‘the productive 
co-management’. The main goal the nationalists hoped to achieve through the 
application of this model was the elimination of class confrontation between 
capitalists and workers. Therefore the state, in its regulatory capacity, was 
called to approve the opening of firms in which co-management was pre-agreed 
and in which production relations are defined in advance. They also proposed 
50  Rodríguez, Manifiesto nacionalista. 21-22.
51  By organisation, the nationalists mean the managerial/technocratic sector.
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a system of social amortization. This would consist in the regulated and pre-
contracted acquisition by the workers of a percentage of the enterprise capital 
in order to transform it, in the long term, in a workers’ enterprise. The first 
step from capitalism to an integrated economy was, for Patria y Libertad, to 
incorporate workers into the directory of already existing capitalist enterprises. 
Economía social de mercado (Social market economy), a term that would 
become emblematic of the model established by the military on the basis of 
a purely neoliberal economic model, had for Chile’s nationalists a definite 
and positive meaning in the kind of model based on the integrated enterprise 
that would be succeeded by the workers enterprise, in order to bring about a 
situation in which the majority of workers, seemingly protected by what the 
nationalists saw as poor and false provisional benefits and plans, suffering from 
bureaucratically inflated costs and supplying scant benefits, would become real 
owners of their own fate. State enterprises should not be completely eliminated 
but will only take care of infrastructural tasks and would also be structured 
according to the model of the integrated enterprise. On the long range, all 
enterprises, involved in what the Manifiesto nacionalista calls a sistema de 
amortización social (System of Social Amortization) would perform a slow 
but steady transfer of capital to the workers, creating a situation of equitable 
economic empowerment for large sections of the population. 
It is necessary to point out that models of this kind, giving substance to 
the paradigm of ‘neither right nor left’ were the product of the revolutionary, 
syndicalist revision of Marxism that had met radical nationalism in the 
eve of the First World War. After that war, Alceste De Ambris elaborated 
detailed programs of this kind to confront both the Marxist and the liberal 
political models with the aim of producing a system that would at the same 
time preserve the efficiency and incentives of capitalism and the social 
justice view of Marxism. De Ambris model of national revolutionary 
syndicalism was incorporated both to the first fascist program of June 1919 
and to the Carta del Carnaro, the Constitution of the Regency of Fiume 
under Gabriele D’Annunzio, in September 1920.52 Later, fascist Italy and 
fascists everywhere found in De Ambris work a source of inspiration for the 
development of a corporativist view of the state, the economy and society. 
This model found echoes in Chile through the dictatorship of General Miguel 
Primo de Rivera, who was seen by Carlos Ibáñez del Campo as a source 
of inspiration in the late 1920s. Furthermore, The Movimiento Nacional 
Socialista de Chile –MNS– in the 1930s, and other Chilean nationalist and 
quasi-fascist groups found their ‘third way’ socio-economic formula in the 
above mentioned model and also in the version of it developed in Spain by 
52  On this subject see, Mario Sznajder, ‘The Carta del Carnaro and Modernization,’ Tel Aviver 
Jahrbuch fur deutsche Geschichte 19 (1989), pp. 439-461.
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José Antonio Primo de Rivera and Falange Española which included strong 
Catholic mystique elements53.
It was very clear to people like Pablo Rodríguez, Sergio Miranda, Gastón 
Acuña o Mario Arnello that the historical opportunity to reach large groups of 
population transforming nationalism from divagations of the intellectual elite 
into a real political force was due to the activist and central role they were 
playing in opposing Marxism. However, it was also clear to them that unlike 
many of their circumstantial political allies, as the Conservative, the Liberals 
(the right) or many Christian Democrats (the Centre) who, besides defending 
well entrenched economic and social interests, would be satisfied with a return 
to the statu quo ante with the Marxist left displaced and barred from power, the 
nationalists should strive for real and deep changes, in order to transform Chile 
into the Estado Integrador [Integral State].
Undoubtedly, the kind of Chilean nationalism preconized by Patria y 
Libertad has very little to do with the then existing democratic traditions and 
with the conservative views of Chile in the 19th century. The imagery built by 
Patria y Libertad around Portales has clear historical-mythical proportions. 
It is not a call to replicate the glories of the past but to build a future in the 
same spirit and with some of the contents Portales casted into Chilean politics 
and institutions. Still, Portales imagery as well as a non-detailed overview 
of his period served to substantiate the idea of the same nation that achieved 
victory in Yungay and conquered the dessert in the North and Araucanía in 
the South. This nation could successfully solve its problems, as serious as 
they may be, and create a bright future. In this kind of Chilean nationalism, 
although the rejection of liberal political, social and economic values is 
almost absolute, a relatively clear project of modernization is attributed to 
the national community rather than to the class or the individual it becomes 
a structure. It was a mobilizing movement that believes in another model of 
politics, conducted rather through the main organized actors of civil society 
–the autonomous intermediate bodies– than through the political parties 
subject to the ‘iron law of oligarchy’.
53  There are many publications on this subject, but as an analysis of the combination between José 
Antonio Primo de Rivera’s ideology and Francisco Franco’s policies see Stanley G. Payne, Franco y 
José Antonio. El extraño caso del fascismo español. Historia de la Falange y del Movimiento Nacional 
(1923-1977) (Barcelona: Planeta, 1998) especially the second part of the book on José Antonio Primo 
de Rivera, 149-377. The English version is Fascism in Spain (1923-1977) (Madison, WI: Wisconsin 
University Press, 2000).
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Conclusions
Nationalisms in Latin America, politically confronting a multifaceted 
problem of identities, social miscegenation, past and present cultural 
influences, adverse political models living through serious crises, and the need 
to find a workable model of development, use –and abuse– history as a source 
of inspiration but mostly, as a reservoir of legitimacy. The particular details 
of each case are different but the pattern is similar. All of them defended their 
ideas in the name of ‘the nation’ –and not of the individual, nor a particular 
class or elite and not even in the name of religion. History provided not 
only myths of past glory and legitimacy, but also a right path into the future 
because the nation was born in it and would build itself always looking into 
its bases, rooted in that past, in its history. In history they looked for the 
laws governing human existence and development. Figures like Portales, 
Rosas and San Martín, Artigas and Bolívar, Sucre and Santa Cruz were not 
only founding fathers and heroes, but also moral models and confronters of 
adversity who achieved their goals. As such, they had set not only precedents 
but also effective models that should be seriously studied in order to extract 
the principles that could again lead ‘the nation’ to the heights achieved under 
the leadership of the founding fathers.
In Latin America, perhaps more than in other corners of the world due to 
the complex past, from a nationalist point of view, the leaders of the nationalist 
movements needed “a history” and historians to stress the role of the nation. 
Migration in all directions, miscegenation, as well as ethnic and socio-
economic and cultural cleavages placed enormous pressures on each ‘nation’. 
The states seemed sometimes as tools in the hands of local oligarchies and 
foreign interests, disregarding the nation, disregarding ‘the people’. Modern 
nationalisms in Latin American tended to become fundamentalist and anti-
imperialist as well as mass mobilizing. The ideology was elaborated in a 
constant dialogue between nationalist politicians and nationalist historians, in 
which the influences were mutual.
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